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Abstract: 
The concept of inference is complex and slippery, specially when linked with that 
of information processing.Cognitively, inferences are a medium to access related 
categories and draw new categorizations. Inferences also facilitate comprehension of 
discourse. A key role of inferences is then to fill gaps in available information to 
complete meanings and contextual senses for the missing ones. So rational use of 
information rests on further implications of exclusive inferential resources. An inferential 
background for information search and processing is then postulated upon interacting 
dynamics between implicit and explicit inferences that may render unforeseeable 
determinants of innovation and creativity. 
Information processing has been usually referred to as "automatic processing", 
"cascade processing", and "conceptually data driven processing". Nevertheless, the 
inferential structures involved in information processing have not been sufficiently 
studied. 
Firstly, in the case of "automatic processing" the issue has been defined as any mental 
operation occurring without the need for conscious initiation nor conscious control, in a 
way that many times have been recalled as preconscious or preattentive processes. 
And this is really the way they happen, however automatic processes are not simply 
random nor hazardous processes, actually they are inferentially pre-coded crystallized 
processes structured to work automatically. One well known automatic phenomenon is 
the "Stroop Effect" (first reported by J. Ridley Stroop in 1935) by which people are 
much slower to say "green" for the incongruent word RED in green ink than for the 
control stimulus XXX in green ink. The incongruity between the color of the meaning 
and the color of the writing ink of the word breaks or suspend the automaticity of the 
process for a while, causing a kind of retardation deserving analysis and explanation. 
Automatic processing seems to be a step-by-step process of in which necessary and 
sufficient inferences to thoroughly solving the problem were thought at one time and 
immediately encoded as algorithms in order not to be slowly thought about again but to 
be quickly unthinkingly acted. So, we consider automatic processing of data 
information as product of compacted inferences to be simply acted. Automatic 
processing is an inferentially expected process, that when incongruity appears it is 
because that something unexpected or not foreseen in the inferential sequence has 
appeared. The set of inferences made automated to reach this effect stands occult and 
compacted as an implicit inference behind this kind of information processing. 
Alternative interference and facilitation effects may occur since later studies 
demonstrated a small facilitation effect when ink color naming time was faster for 
congruent stimuli such as the word RED in red ink than for the XXX control word. This 
means that contrarily when the implicit inference is confirmed by data, the automatic 
processing is accelerated, thus showing a facilitation effect. This way, interference 
effect seems to correspond to implicit contradiction, and facilitation effect to implicit 
confirmation as behind inferential effects on the automated inference. This provides an 
alternative explanation to the problem of the intricate relationship between information 
and inference at this automatic level of information processing. 
Secondly, in the case of "cascade processing". This term refers to the notion that 
"later" stages of processing can be set into operation prior to the completion of 
processing of earlier stages (Mc Clelland, 1979, and Humphreys, 1991 in Blackwell 
Dictionary of Cognitive Psychology, Ed. Eysenck, Michael W. 1991). A complex task 
can be broken down into a number of distinct stages, which, put together, enable the 
complete task to be performed. In addition, many of these stages can be sequentially 
ordered, in the sense that "early" stages must begin before "later stages". Information 
processing models of cognitive performance typically assume that processing is based 
on a series of such component stages. A discrete processing model is one in which 
information is passed from one stage to another only after processing at the earlier 
stage is completed (Sternberg, 1969). 
A system operating in cascade can be thought of as entertaining sets of hypotheses 
about stimuli, that are confirmed or disconfirmed as more stimulus information is 
gathered. The way in which different variables affect a system operating in cascade is 
considerably more complex than the way in which variables affect a discrete 
processing system. Cascade models of performance have gained in popularity since 
the advent of "connectionist" models of information processing, many of which operate 
in a cascade manner. Cascade operations are also important for the way in which such 
models can learn relations between stimuli and responses (Rumelhart, Hinton & 
Williams, 1986). Tests of whether human information processing is best conceptualized 
in terms of a discrete or a cascade processing model have to date produced mixed 
results. 
Thirdly, in the case when comparing "data driven processing" to "conceptually driven 
processing" the connection between information and inference becomes more evident. 
The distinction between these two types of informational models refers to the 
corresponding flow of control in information processing. Data driven processing is a 
bottom-up information processing that is initiated, guided and determined by stimulus 
information coming in from the outside world and currently being received by the sense 
organs. Conceptually driven processing is a top-down information processing guided 
by information already stored in memory; that is, guided by the prior knowledge and 
concepts acquired from previous experience. The distinction between bottom-up and 
top-down processing comes from computer science (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975). 
Bottom-up processing is an informational sequence that starts with a low-level analysis 
of the sensory inputs coming from the physical features of external stimuli and ends by 
building upwards toward a final high-level interpretation or categorization. Top-down 
processing begins with higher level processes generating expectations and hypotheses 
from immediate interpretation and categorical evaluations of the sensorial input. Many 
cognitive activities, such as memory, perception, and language understanding, can 
involve both data-driven and concept-driven processing, but their role is different and 
controversial. Data-driven processing is the basic approach emphasized by Gibson’s 
(1979) theory of direct perception, while top-down processing is the basic approach for 
constructivist or inferential theories of perception. For Gibson, dynamic changes in 
visual patterns, for example, provide enough stimulus information from environmental 
objects to be directly recognize in a way that is sufficiently rich to adopt proper actions 
and applications in reply. On the opposite side, the constructivist or inferencial 
approach see perception as a-priori influenced by expectations that derive from the 
perceiver’s past experience as well as from the current context. Recognition is the 
product of inferences based on knowledge about how the world is organized, that 
works as a supplement of the sense data. The contribution of top-down processing 
varies with the availability of contextual information and with the quality of the stimulus 
information. Top-down processing offers short cuts so that a message can be 
understood without having to be completely analyzed. 
Summarily, data-driven processes are characterized as parallel, automatic, effortless, 
unconscious, and relatively unaffected by capacity limitations; while concept-driven 
processing, by contrast, are characterized as serial, requiring conscious control, and 
drawing on limited capacity resources. 
However, an intermediate approach between the two antagonistic above is represented 
by Neisser’s (1967) analysis-by-synthesis model, which incorporates both data-driven 
and conceptually driven processing working interactively and altogether. Within this 
view, the relative contribution of each type of processing is flexibly determined by the 
quality of the stimulus information and the availability of contextual information. In the 
analysis-by-synthesis model (Cohen, 1991, pg. 89) "the initial stage of data-driven 
analysis is followed by a stage in which an internal representation is synthesized. The 
synthesis is based on the information derived from the initial analysis together with 
conceptually driven hypotheses derived from prior knowledge. This representation is 
then matched against the input. If there is a match, the stimulus is recognized; if a 
mismatch occurs, the cycle is repeated and alternative representations are synthesized 
until a match is found". Interactive models of this general kind have been developed to 
account for language processing. Language understanding involves several levels of 
analysis, both low-level processes of physical analysis and higher level processes 
carrying out syntactic and semantic analysis. In speech and reading perception data-
driven and concept-driven processes interact permanently. 
A fourth example could be represented by the chunking phenomenon. The concept 
of chunking refers to the notion that some of the limitations of short-term memory can 
be overcome by grouping or chunking of information into larger units. This 
reconstruction process was forwarded by George Miller (1956) in his influential article 
entitled "The magical number seven, plus and minus two". Miller termed "chunk" each 
recoded pack of information, and proposed that the immediate memory span, 
measured in chunks, is relatively constant (for seven plus or minus two) for different 
types of material. 
And a fifth example could rest on categorization, here the inference is a visible part of 
the process. 
What is inference and what is creativity with respect to information and information 
processing. 
An inference is made whenever a reasoner, either human or machine, goes beyond the 
evidence given by information. Inferences occur in every kind of understanding and 
reasoning processes. But inferences may be valid or not valid from a formal logical 
standpoint. However, inferences are mostly made in cases in which are only likely to be 
the case, rather than in cases in which are necessarily the case. Inferences usually 
allude to different relations to be stated between meaningful terms, but these relations 
can be stated in terms of formal and propositional logic, class and relation logic, set 
theory, modal expressions and heuristically. 
From a logical standpoint basic inferences are deductive or inductive. A number of 
aspects of inferences are of interest to the psychologists: First, there is the question of 
how efficiently human beings draw conclusions which are licensed (or enabled) by the 
logic of a situation. Second, the same question can be asked of specified kinds of 
pragmatic reasoning, where the conclusion may be about the likelihood of something, 
rather than something necessarily being the case. But above all, and as Sanford (1991) 
states "inferences occur everywhere in perception, reasoning, understanding, and 
language comprehension. This raises the third and perhaps most important issue, that 
of what it is that controls and contains the inferences which one makes in a given 
situation, a particularly interesting issue, since in theory, most premises will allow an 
indeterminately large set of inferences to be made (Sanford, 1991, pp. 187)". 
What is then creativity? "Creativity" refers to the ability to produce unusual, high-quality 
solutions to problems. It has often been argued that there are significant aspects of 
human intelligence which are not adequately assessed by intelligence tests. Guilford 
(1961), for example, drew a distinction between convergent thinking, which is required 
by most intelligence tests, and divergent thinking, which is not. However, creativity 
seems to be more firmly related to divergent rather than to convergent thinking. As 
Eysenck (1991, pp. 86) states it: "Convergent thinking refers to thinking of a deductive 
kind in which there is a single appropriate answer, whereas divergent thinking involves 
non-logical processes and novel situations in which there may be several relevant 
answers". "Divergent thinking, or the ability to think of diverse valuable alternatives to a 
novel situation, forms a major part of which is often known as creativity". 
Creativity has been a notoriously evasive and difficult phenomenon to study in 
laboratory. Many test of divergent thinking or creativity are basically measuring 
originality rather than creativity. That is to say, they assess the tendency to produce 
unusual solutions to a problem, but do no evaluate satisfactorily the quality and 
usefulness of those solutions. This is a criterion conducive to think that a creative 
genius is the same as a mad man insofar as he does not deviate into a socially and 
culturally successful path of discovery and invention. 
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